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THE MUNICIPAL INCOME TAX AND STATE
PREEMPTION IN CALIFORNIA
California cities may be opening a pandora's box of local taxes
in their search for new sources of revenue. The primary source of
revenue for municipalities, the property tax, is inadequate, inequi-
table, and outdated.' Cities, frustrated in their attempt to find an
adequate, alternative source of revenue, are forced to impose a
multitude of levies on the resident, non-resident, and visitor to the
city. Cities levy a variety of license, sales and use taxes in their
search for new sources of revenue. Levying numerous low yield
taxes is objectionable for two reasons. First, the system is perpetu-
ally inefficient. The many distinct, unrelated taxes create greater
administrative costs which result in lower revenue yields. This
unsatisfactory yield, in turn, requires taxation of new activities,
goods, and services. Secondly, the body of taxes and system of
taxation which evolves is not based on ability to pay. Therefore, the
inequities of local taxation under such a system increase.
The solution obviously lies in utilizing another single, reliable
source of revenue. A municipal income tax appears to be this neces-
sary solution. One hundred seventy cities throughout the United
States have proven that a municipal income tax is an adequate, effi-
cient, and reliable source of revenue.' However, California cities
are deterred from imposing a local income tax because the state has
preempted the field. The state legislature has expressly prohibited
all California cities from levying a local income tax.3
The aim of this comment is to analyze the nature of the taxing
power of California cities and the legislature's authority to preempt
the field of local income taxation. This comment's analysis will be
divided into six basic categories. The first three sections deal with
the status of California law regarding the guarantee of home rule
and the power of local taxation. This necessarily includes an analy-
sis of the constitutional basis for preemption of the field of income
taxation. The remaining three sections will analyze and weigh the
interests of the city against the interests of the state in an attempt
1 See Januta, The Municipal Revenue Crisis: California Problems and Possibilities,
56 CAI F. L. REV. 1525 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Januta].
2 TAx FOUNDATION, INC. CITY INCOME TAXEs. (Research Pub. No. 12, 1967),
26-38 [hereinafter cited as CITY INCOME TAxEs].
8 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041.5 (West 1970). "Notwithstanding any statute,
ordinance, regulation, rule or decision to the contrary, no city,... whether chartered or
not, shall levy or collect or cause to be levied or collected any tax upon the income,
or any part thereof, of any person, resident or nonresident."
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to show that California cities' have the right to levy a municipal
income tax.4
HOME RULE AND THE POWER OF TAXATION
The issues involved in the municipality's power to levy an
income tax concern only home rule chartered cities as distinguished
from general law cities. The general law of the state governs general
law cities making the state's preemption of income taxation binding.
However, with regard to charter cities, the general law is not neces-
sarily binding if the subject matter involved is of municipal concern.
California adopted home rule provisions intending to provide Cali-
fornia cities with some autonomy in governing municipal affairs.5
The home rule sections provide that any city with 3,500 inhabitants
may frame a charter for its own government.6 Pursuant to the
adoption of such charter, the city may make and enforce all laws
and regulations regarding municipal affairs subject only to the
restrictions and limitations provided in the city's own charter and
the California Constitution. 7 Local ordinances concerned with strict-
ly municipal affairs govern over any conflicting laws of the state.8
However, in all other matters, the city is subject to the general law
of the state.
A fundamental power guaranteed in the home rule grant is the
power of taxation for local purposes. California courts have long
concluded that the power of taxation is an essential, inherent power
of the city.
A municipality without the power of taxation would be a body without
life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose. When such a
corporation is created, the power of taxation is vested in it, as an
essential attribute, for all the purposes of its existence, unless its
exercise be in express terms prohibited.
4 The Superior Court of Sonoma County upheld the state legislature's preemp-
tion of the field of income taxation in County of Alameda v. City & County of San
Francisco, No. 60398, Nov. 7, 1968. Appeal is now pending, 1 Civil No. 26558, 1st
App. Dist., Div. 2 (filed Feb. 17, 1969).
r The object of amending California Constitution article XI, § 6 in 1896 from
"cities and towns and charters thereof, should be subject to and controlled by the
general law" to "except in municipal affairs" was to secure to the municipality that
had "adopted a charter for its own government, the maintenance of its charter pro-
visions in municipal matters, and to deprive the legislature of the power, . . . to
interfere in the government and management of the municipality. Ex parte Braun, 141
Cal. 204, 209, 74 P. 780, 782 (1903).
o CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8(a).
7 Id. § 6.
8 West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d
516, 95 P.2d 138 (1939); Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 74 P. 780 (1903).
9 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6.
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The power of cities operating under freeholder's charters to raise
money by taxation for municipal purposes does not find the source in
any grant by the Legislature .... Such power has been directly granted
by the people of the State by the provisions of the Constitution."0
Since the city's power to tax is essential to its very existence,
it is apparently entitled to be relatively free from legislative inter-
ference. The difficulty lies in determining to what degree the city's
power to tax should be free from legislative interference. The Con-
stitution prohibits the legislature from taking over the city's power
to tax for municipal purposes. 1 However, the problem is to deter-
mine the extent to which the state may limit the city's taxing power.
The traditional statement is that municipal taxation for municipal
purposes is a "municipal affair." 2 If this is the rule, apparently the
state has no authority to limit the city's taxing power. However, the
rule is not absolute. The city cannot adopt a tax policy which would
be significantly injurious to the state as a whole. 3 The expression
that municipal taxation for municipal purposes is a "municipal af-
fair" represents an attempt to protect the city's right to exercise its
fundamental power of taxation within reasonable limits. To define
these reasonable limits, we need to analyze the possible basis for
state preemption under the constitutional home rule section itself.
THE BASIS FOR PREEMPTION UNDER ARTICLE XI
SECTION SIx OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
The home rule guarantee, Article XI section six of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, provides that a charter city is empowered "to
make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal
affairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in
10 Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209, 212-13, 74 P. 780, 782, 783 (1903)
quoting United States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381, 393 (1878); accord, City. of
Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 308 P.2d 1 (1957); Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34
Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949); West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County of
San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 95 P.2d 138 (1939).
The power of taxation is inherent in the city not only because the Constitution
prohibits the legislature from taxing municipal corporations and their inhabitants
for municipal purposes but also because the Constitution prohibits the delegation of
such power to any special commissioner, private corporation, company, or individual.
Security Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hinton, 97 Cal. 214, 219, 32 P. 3, 5 (1893).
11 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 12.
12 City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 308 P.2d 1 (1957); Ainsworth
v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949); West Coast Advertising Co. v. City
& County of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 95 P.2d 138 (1939); Keyes v. City &
County of San Francisco, 177 Cal. 313, 173 P. 475 (1918) ; Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal.
204, 74 P. 780 (1903).
13 Century Plaza Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. App. 3d 616, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 166 (1970).
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their several charters, and in respect to other matters they shall
be subject to and controlled by general laws."' 4 The legislative
basis for preemption under section six depends on the California
courts' interpretation of "municipal affairs." The courts, in regula-
tory areas, give a narrow interpretation to "municipal affairs." In
tax matters, however, the court's position is not so clear. The prob-
lem, then, is deciding at what point local taxation for municipal
purposes is no longer a municipal affair but becomes a matter of
state concern sufficient to justify preemption. Resolving this problem
necessarily demands an understanding of the preemption doctrine
and its effect on the constitutional guarantee of home rule.
The doctrine of preemption has a significant impact on the
home rule guarantee. When the legislature preempts a particular
field, no local legislation on the matter is allowed. The state has
occupied the field to the exclusion of municipal legislation. 5 The
effect of the preemption doctrine on the home rule guarantee de-
mands that the court adopt a balancing test as the basis for finding
state preemption. The test for finding preemption should in some
degree preserve the constitutional guarantee of home rule to charter
cities and yet allow the state an appropriate degree of freedom to
deal with matters of state interest without fear that their policies
may be frustrated by a particular city.
In regulatory matters, as distinguished from tax matters, Cali-
fornia courts utilize three tests for finding a particular field impliedly
preempted by the legislature. In the case of In re Hubbard,"6 the
California Supreme Court held a particular field to be preempted
when:
1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by
general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a
matter of state concern; 2) the subject matter has been partially
covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly
that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional
local action; or 3) the subject matter has been partially covered by
general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect
of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs
the possible benefit to the municipality.17
The first method is based on a quantitative approach. However, the
mere quantity of legislation provides no guidance in determining
whether the legislature intended to preempt the particular field. The
14 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
15 In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964). See
Comment, The California City versus Preemption by Implication, 17 HASTINGS L. J.
603 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 17 HAsTINGS L. J. 603].
16 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964).
17 Id. at 128, 396 P.2d at 815, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
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task is to determine whether the legislation is so interrelated that
the court "can detect a patterned approach to the subject."' 8 The
latter two methods are based on a qualitative approach. California
courts hold a particular field preempted by state legislation when-
ever a paramount state interest is involved or when the adverse
effects on transients in the state caused by local legislation outweigh
the benefits to the municipality.
Presumably the court will utilize the same bases to uphold
express legislative preemption as it uses to uphold implied legislative
preemption. As the California Supreme Court held in Bishop v. City
of San Jose,19 "the Legislature is empowered neither to determine
what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into
a matter of statewide concern."2 ° The court will determine whether
the particular matter is a municipal affair and, consequently, whether
the legislature may preempt a particular field to the exclusion of
local legislation.
The rationalization for holding a particular field impliedly pre-
empted in regulatory matters is the inherent need for uniformity
of regulation. To prevent unnecessary confusion and uncertainty,
the state legislation must control.2 ' This is especially true where
criminal penalties are involved. Therefore, California courts have
severely limited the city's home rule powers in matters of regulation.
The California Supreme Court interprets section six of Article XI
to mean that local legislation prevails over general law only when
the subject matter is "exclusively," 22 "solely,"28 or "strictly"2 4 a
municipal affair. In any matter where a state interest is involved,
general law governs.25 Thus, in regulatory matters the Constitution
prohibits the city from passing an ordinance which is in conflict with
the general laws.2" An ordinance conflicts with general law if it is
identical to the state law, authorizes what the general law prohibits,
18 Galvan v. Superior Court of the City & County of San Francisco, 70 Cal.
2d 851, 862, 452 P.2d 930, 937, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 649 (1969).
19 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
20 Id. at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
21 In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 111, 372 P.2d 897, 904, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 864
(1962) (concurring opinion).
22 Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 291,
384 P.2d 158, 166-67, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838-39 (1963).
23 Id.
24 Ex parte Nowak, 184 Cal. 701, 704, 195 P. 402, 403 (1921).
25 Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 535, 469 P.2d 353, 82 Cal. Rptr. 515
(1970); Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1969); Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 384
P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963).
26 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
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or prohibits what the legislature authorizes.27 Thus, the city's main
role in regulatory matters is merely one of passing supplementary
ordinances for unique local problems if the field is not preempted. 8
The vital question now is whether the tests for preemption by
implication in regulatory matters should be utilized in matters of
taxation. To determine the basis for state preemption, the court
must remember that the power of taxation is an essential, inherent
power of the city fundamental to its existence. The bases for pre-
emption of a field of taxation should protect the charter city's right
to tax. However, the city's right to determine its own local tax
policies should only enjoy protection to the extent that the state,
as a whole, does not suffer significantly.
With the above objective in mind, the "comprehensive state
legislation" basis for finding preemption by implication cannot
apply. Even though the state has extensive legislation covering a
particular type of taxation, this is not a proper basis for finding the
field preempted. It is evident that there may be concurrent, identical
state and local forms of taxation. The state and city both levy sales
taxes, license taxes, and personal property taxes .2  To hold that
extensive state legislation on a particular form of taxation is a basis
for preemption would make the city's taxing power completely
dependent upon legislative authority; a result California courts
have rejected. 0 The city, through the home rule grant, may have
concurrent taxing powers with the state. Thus, the field of local
income taxation is not preempted simply because the state has a
comprehensive scheme of state income taxation.
The proper basis for state preemption of a field of local taxa-
tion should parallel the last two tests the California Supreme Court
enounced in the case of In re Hubbard: 1) the area of taxation is
of such paramount state concern that further local taxation cannot
be tolerated; or 2) the particular local tax adversly affects transient
citizens in such a manner as to outweigh the possible benefits to the
municipality.8 These tests would both protect the state as a whole
and preserve some of the autonomy guaranteed a charter city by the
California Constitution. In tax matters, these tests must be strictly
applied because we are dealing with a fundamental, constitutionally
27 In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 812, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396
(1964).
28 See 17 HASTINGS L.J. 603.
29 See CALIF. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON REVENUE AND TAXATION, FINANCING
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA, Vol. 4 No. 13 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
FINANCING LOCAL GOV'T].
30 Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 74 P. 780 (1903).
31 In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 812, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396
(1964).
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guaranteed power of the city. The state's interests must clearly out-
weigh those of the city in order to justify legislative interference
with the city's autonomous taxing power. If not, the long established
principle that a charter city should enjoy autonomy in local tax
matters32 is meaningless.
A recent decision, Century Plaza Hotel Co. v. City of Los
Angeles,33 causes some confusion. The California Court of Appeal
for the second district upheld the state legislature's preemption of
the field of taxation on the sale of alcoholic beverages when the local
tax exceeds one percent. The court noted that taxation and regula-
tion of alcoholic beverages are interrelated because high taxation of
alcoholic beverages could result in a return to illegal trafficking.
Therefore local taxation of liquor for revenue purposes was not a
municipal affair but one of statewide concern. 4 Although the court
indicated that the legislature could preempt a field of taxation
wherever there was "any state interest" involved, the decision
seemed to be based on the fact that the case involved a fairly high
tax on the sale of alcoholic beverages. 5 Despite the fact that the
tax was intended to raise revenue, the court's decision was based
on the tax's regulatory effect. The court was careful to limit its
decision to the area of taxation of alcoholic beverages.
The "any state interest" basis for state preemption of a field
of local taxation is unacceptable. Justice Peters, dissenting in Bishop
v. City of San Jose,6 noted that almost every controversy brought
before the court involved both municipal and state interests.8 7 Since
this is true, the "any state interest" test would make the city's
inherent power of local taxation completely dependent upon the
legislature and state tax policy. The legislature has a valid state
interest in maintaining a favorable tax climate throughout the
state-favorable at both state and local levels. Should California
courts follow the "any state interest" test indicated in Century
Plaza Hotel, a city's attempt to levy an income tax must fail and
the constitutional guarantee of home rule is completely meaning-
less.
Consequently, the proper basis for legislative preemption of a
field of taxation should be: 1) the area of taxation is of such para-
mount state concern that further local taxation cannot be tolerated;
32 See note 5, supra.
33 7 Cal. App. 3d 616, 87 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1970).
34 Id. at 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
35 Los Angeles attempted to impose a local excise tax of 5% upon the purchase
price of alcoholic beverages. Id. at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
36 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
37 Id. at 67-69, 460 P.2d at 144-46, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 472-74 (dissenting opinion).
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or 2) the particular local tax adversely affects transient citizens in
such a manner as to outweigh the possible benefits to the munici-
pality.
However, before applying these tests to the issue of local
income taxation another constitutional issue arises. California has
specific constitutional provisions authorizing the taxation of in-
come." Since a California charter city's home rule powers are
limited both by its charter and the California Constitution, 9 it is
necessary to determine whether the constitutional income tax
provisions limit the power of income taxation to the state.
THE BASIS FOR PREEMPTION UNDER ARTICLE XIII, SECTIONS
ELEVEN AND THIRTEEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
California Constitution Article XIII, section eleven provides
that "[i] ncome taxes may be assessed to and collected from persons,
corporations, joint-stock associations, or companies resident or doing
business in this state, or any one or more of them, in such cases and
amounts, and in such manner, as shall be prescribed by law."4
Section thirteen of the same article provides that "[t]he Legisla-
ture shall pass all laws necessary to carry out the provisions of this
article."'"
Section eleven is an enabling provision authorizing California
government to levy an income tax. Unfortunately section eleven
does not indicate which California governmental body may levy a
tax on income. Two interpretations of section eleven have been
proposed. These interpretations attempt to lodge the exclusive
power to tax income in the state legislature. One interpretation
emphasizes the phrase "as shall be prescribed by law."42 Supposedly
the use of the word "law" indicates an intent that all laws dealing
with the taxation of income must be prescribed by the state legisla-
ture. Presumably, this interpretation is based on the customary
description of legislative enactments as "laws" while enactments by
the city are generally referred to as "ordinances." This interpreta-
tion is unacceptable. Our constitutional framers did not use such
subtle distinctions to express their intent. The framers of section
eleven could have easily and clearly said income taxes may be
assessed and collected as the legislature shall prescribe. Significantly,
they did not.
88 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 11, 13.
39 Id. art. XI, § 6.
40 Id. § 11.
41 Id. art. XIII, § 13.
42 See Januta, supra note 1, at 1541-43, analyzing the phrase "as shall be pre-
scribed by law" and the contention that it refers exclusively to state statutes.
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Even if the word "law" indicates the proper governmental
body authorized to tax income, the only reasonable interpretation
is that both the city and the legislature are so authorized. The home
rule section refers to enactments of the city as "laws and regula-
tions."4 The subtle distinction between laws and ordinances does
not seem to be recognized by the Constitution. The California Su-
preme Court has held that the phrase "as may be provided by law"
refers not only to legislative enactments but also to charter provi-
sions of a California city.44 The only realistic interpretation of the
phrase "as shall be prescribed by law" is that it embodies the
fundamental principle of taxation under representative government:
No tax may be imposed by inference or implication but rather the
bounds of a tax must be measured by express enactment.45
The second interpretation emphasizes the word "state" in
section eleven. The use of the word "state" is significant because
it is the only geographical criterion utilized. Therefore, the power
to tax income in the scope prescribed by section eleven must belong
exclusively to the state legislature.46 This argument is also unaccept-
able. Reliance on such subtle interpretations of the Constitution
cannot be accepted in order to defeat the intent of the section. If
the constitutional framers of section eleven intended the legislature
to have the exclusive power to tax income, they could have made a
direct and clear statement of such intent. There are at least 30
instances in the tax and revenue articles of the Constitution where
the legislature is specifically directed or authorized to take particular
action.4 7 In this light, it is significant that section eleven does not
specifically identify the legislature. The only reasonable conclusion
to be drawn from section eleven is that California governments may
tax income.
Section eleven and section thirteen read together state that if
an income tax is levied by California government, the legislature
shall pass all necessary laws for assessment and collection. This
reading is a better indication of the Constitution's intention to
deposit the exclusive power to tax income in the state legislature.
The command word "shall" used in express reference to the legisla-
ture arguably indicates an intent to deposit the exclusive power in
43 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
44 Rothschild v. Bantel, 152 Cal. 5, 8-10, 91 P. 803, 805 (1907).
45 56 CAL. JuR. 2d Taxation § 14 (1959).
46 Respondents in the commuter tax case make this argument. Brief for Respon-
dent, County of Alameda v. City & County of San Francisco, 1 Civil No. 26558, 1st
App. Dist., Div. 2. (filed Feb. 17, 1969).
47 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1, 1(c), 1(d), Y4(a), I14(b), 11, 2.8, 3, 7, 9, 9.5,
13, 14, 144A(e)(3), 144A(i), 15, 16(1)(b), 16(2), 19, 21(2), 21(3), 21(4), 21(5),
21.5, 22, 23, 25.5, 26, 27, 28.
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that body. 8 However, if this interpretation is adopted, the logical
consequence is that legislative enactments are supreme in all fields
of taxation mentioned in Article XIII. Conceivably, the state may
totally preempt the city's power to tax real 9 and personal prop-
erty. ° The power to tax, essential to a city's existence, would be
impotent if the only sources of revenue free from legislative inter-
ference are taxes not enumerated in Article XIII. A charter city's
power to tax would become completely dependent upon the state
legislature. But California courts have rejected this result. The
courts have long established the principle that local taxation for
municipal purposes is a municipal affair free from legislative inter-
ference."'
The legislature's power under Article XIII must be read in
light of the home rule provisions. The home rule provisions created
a power of taxation in charter cities concurrent with, not dependent
upon, the state legislature. Article XIII can be the basis for legisla-
tive preemption of a charter city's taxing power only where there
is specific language to that effect.52 Accordingly, when we read
section eleven along with section thirteen, the legislature has no
authority under these provisions to preempt the field.
The key word in section thirteen is "necessary." The state is
limited to passing legislation "necessary" to the imposition of a
state income tax. "[The legislature] is not authorized, required, or
empowered to pass laws that are not necessary to carry [the provi-
sions of Article XIII] into effect. . . ."" Since preemption deals
with prohibition and not with assessing and collecting an income
tax, there is no constitutional basis for the legislature's express pre-
emption of the income tax field under sections eleven and thirteen
of Article XIII.
The constitutional convention debates concerning section eleven
provide some help in resolving this dilemma. 4 The income tax
48 See note 46, supra.
49 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
50 Id. § 14. Note, the field over 1% for personal property taxes is preempted by
the Bradley-Burns Uniform Local Sales & Use Tax Law for cities utilizing the collec-
tion advantages of this act. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 7200-7209 (West 1970).
51 See note 12, supra.
52 "Where the power of taxation has been lodged in the state to the exclusion
of municipalities and other entities of that character, it has customarily been done
by specific language expressive of such purpose." Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d
465, 472, 211 P.2d 564, 568 (1949).
53 People v. Central Pac. R.R., 83 Cal. 393, 405-6, 23 P. 303, 307 (1890). Any
language asserting that the legislature has the sole authority to determine who may
tax cannot be used to limit a charter city's taxing power. The case was heard in
1890 prior to the 1896 and 1914 adoptions of the home-rule provisions.
54 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
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provision was adopted for some enlightening reasons. The delegate
who introduced the provision and those who supported him did so
primarily because of the "injustice and inequality of the [existing]
system of taxation."5 5 California, at the time, relied primarily on
a property tax system, with some reliance on poll and license taxes,
for its revenues. The aim of section eleven was to adopt a system
of taxation which would relieve Californians of the inequities of
the property tax system. 6 Ironically the inequities the income tax
provision was intended to relieve are the same inequities existing
in our local system of taxation. Property is not always a valid
indicator of ability to pay, yet the property tax is the city's primary
source of revenue. A fundamental rule of constitutional interpreta-
tion is to interpret constitutional provisions liberally in order to
accomplish the objects of its establishment.5 7 In order to curb in-
creasing inequities of the property tax system and preserve a
respectable degree of home rule, a California charter city must have
concurrent authority to levy an income tax under section eleven of
Article XIII of the California Constitution.
THE MUNICIPAL INCOME TAX AS A SOURCE OF REVENUE
The city income tax is important because it has proven to be
a reliable source of revenue5" and is based on the best practical indica-
tor of ability to pay. The typical city income tax is a flat rate tax
levied on gross earnings of the individual and net profits of busi-
ness.59 Some may object that this tax is regressive and inequitable. 0
However in order to maintain a productive source of revenue and
to keep administrative costs low, the city must levy a flat rate on
gross earnings. The inequities which result from a flat rate munici-
pal income tax are kept at a minimum due to the low rate imposed.
Cities levying an income tax in the United States tax at a rate
ranging from .5 percent to 2 percent, with a majority of the cities
taxing at a rate of 1 percent or less." Moreover, gross income is
still a better indicator of ability to pay than property.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 945-48 (1878-79); 3 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1470-71 (1878-79).
55 Id. at 945.
56 Id.
57 11 CAL. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 43 (1953).
58 See note 2, supra.
59 CITY INCOME TAXES at 15-25. See also Stephens, The Suburban Impact of
Earnings Tax Policies, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 313 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Stephens].
60 See The Limits of Municipal Income Taxation: The Response in Ohio, 7
HARV. J. LECIS. 271, 274-75 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 271].
61 CrrY INCOME TAXES at 24. During the first twenty years Philadelphia levied
an income tax, its tax rate never exceeded 11% but fluctuated between 11% and
1% as needs required. Phillips, Philadelphia's Income Tax After Twenty Years, 11
NAT'L TAX J. 241, 243 (1958).
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The desirable tax system should not only tax according to ability
to pay but also according to benefits received.62 A property tax only
taxes the resident, while the non-resident earning an income in the
city contributes nothing for the benefits he receives while in the
city." A local income tax remedies this problem. The tax is on
income earned in the city whether earned by a resident or a non-
resident. Thus, the non-resident is forced to contribute something
according to the benefits received. Certainly the city should tax the
non-resident at a lower rate than the resident because the non-resi-
dent does not receive the same amount of benefits. The legislature
would be justified in placing a ratio limitation on the rate a city
may tax income of the non-resident. 64
Administrative costs in levying an income tax are relatively
low. "[T]heorists once made gloomy predictions about administra-
tion and compliance problems .. . .But actual experience has...
demonstrated that the city income tax may be administered with
reasonable efficiency . *. .."" The low administrative costs incurred
in levying the local income tax are explained largely as a conse-
quence of its simple structure and withholding procedure.66 The
average city cost for collection was 4.4 percent of the total revenue
received. In larger jurisdictions these costs dropped to 3.9 percent.67
The local income tax does not impose great compliance burdens
on the taxpayer. The wage earner experiences almost no burden
since deductions are usually taken from his wages by his employer.
The added cost to employers to make these deductions in the age
of the computer appears to be minimal. Deductions are already
required for federal income taxes. The added administrative cost
of deducting local taxes would not be too burdensome.6 s
A municipal income tax seems to be the necessary solution to
preserve California cities' constitutional guarantee of home rule.
Projected California local government revenue needs for 1973 are
about ten and one half billion dollars. Five and one quarter billion
62 See FxANCING LocAL Gov'T at 42. The California Assembly committee on
Revenue and Taxation suggested various criteria to consider in selecting future sources
of local revenue.
63 The aim of the commuter tax in San Francisco was to make the non-resident
working in the city pay for some of the benefits he receives. San Francisco, Cal.,
Ordinance 246-68, § 2, Aug. 19, 1968.
64 For example, the legislature may limit the city's power to tax non-resident
income at one half the rate imposed on its residents.
65 CITY INCOME TAXEs at 22-24.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 24.
68 Reports from ten firms gave deduction costs ranging from ten to five hundred
dollars. Id. at 25.
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dollars is estimated to come from the property tax.69 Further reli-
ance on the property tax is economically and politically infeasible. 0
The general public opposition to increased property taxes indicates
that if increased taxation is necessary, the property tax cannot be
the source. Where is the balance to come from? Certainly a portion
should come from state and federal subsidy. However, further
reliance on subsidies means that the city will not have the final
determination of what public services it will provide. Rather, such
determinations will be made in the Congress 71 or state legislature.
The city, to preserve some degree of autonomy, will be forced to
levy a multitude of low yield taxes which are even more undesirable.
The necessary alternative is to recognize the California cities' right
to levy a municipal income tax.
WEIGHING THE STATE INTERESTS
The legislature fears that municipal income taxation may have
several detrimental effects. The state believes that a municipal in-
come tax will have an adverse effect on the individual; that it will
have an unfavorable impact on state and local economies; and that it
will promote conflict and competition for tax dollars between neigh-
boring cities. Any one of these interests may be of sufficient para-
mount interest to justify state preemption. Although great weight
will be given to the legislature's conclusions, the California Supreme
Court has declared that the court will decide whether the basis for
preemption is valid.7 2 The court's duty then is to determine whether
the legislature's fears of the local income tax are warranted.
The legislature fears that local income taxation will adversely
affect the individual in two ways. The first fear is that combined
federal, state and local taxation of income will be too burdensome
on the individual.73 Secondly, the legislature fears that municipal
income taxation will impede the individual's search for employ-
ment.74 Concerning the first contention, evidence from cities levying
an income tax is quite revealing. Although not conclusive, the evi-
dence indicates that per-capita total taxes in income tax cities are
69 FINANciNG LOCAL GOV'T at 38.
70 Januta, supra note 1, at 1538.
71 President Nixon's proposal for revenue sharing with the cities would provide
cities with new and unrestricted funds. However, Congress is not likely to allow
federal funds to pass without any restrictions. See Nixon, State of the Union Mes-
sage, 37 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 226, 228 (February 1, 1971).
72 Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 63, 460 P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr.
465, 469 (1969).
73 Cal. Stats., 1968, ch. 1265, § 2, at 2388-89 (1968). See also FiNANCNG LocAL
Gov'T at 42.
74 Cal. Stats., 1968, ch. 559, § 3, at 1225 (1968).
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equivalent to or lower than those in other cities. 5 That they would
tend to be lower is logically explained. A local income tax broadens
the tax base considerably taking in residents and non-residents. This
results in a lower per-capita share of the tax burden. This fact, and
the experience of states levying state and municipal income taxes76
should dispel the legislature's fear that combined federal, state and
local tax rates would make taxation on income prohibitory.
Concerning the second contention, the legislature has declared
that it is contrary to state policy to have any unnecessary barriers
to the mobility of the individual to seek employment. 77 The concern
that a local income tax will impede the individual's mobility to
search for employment is unacceptable. The local income tax rate
is so low that its deterrent effect on the mobility of the individual
is doubtful. States utilizing a municipal income tax have no evidence
that the tax acts as an impediment to the individual's search for
employment.78 An attempt to classify a local income tax on residents
and non-residents as an "unnecessary" barrier to seeking employ-
ment is arbitrary and unfounded. Occupation taxes certainly seem
to be an impediment to the professional seeking to locate in a certain
municipality. High property taxes may also be said to be an impedi-
ment to mobility. Yet, presumably, these taxes fall into the category
of "necessary." There is no rational basis for concluding that local
income taxation is an "unnecessary" barrier. Rather, in light of
increasing property taxes, increasing inequities under the property
tax system, and increasing revenue needs, local income taxation
seems to be the "necessary" solution.
The legislature fears that municipal income taxation will have
an unfavorable impact on state and local economies. On the local
level, the state believes that municipal income taxation may be a
further impetus to the migration of business and industry from
the central city to the suburbs. The legislature fears that an un-
favorable local tax climate will reinforce economic factors causing
the migrational trend that is increasing the deterioration of our
inner cities.79
Local tax structures do appear to be swing factors in intrastate
locational decisions of industry and business.80 However, as to turn-
75 CITy INCOME TAXES at 31.
76 Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, New York and Pennsylvania levy both state
and local income taxes.
77 See note 74, supra.
78 Taylor, Local Income Taxes After Twenty-One Years, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 113,
124 (1962).
79 See note 74, supra.
80 U. S. ADVISORY CoMmIssIoN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LocAL
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ing back the migrational trend of business and industry, the con-
clusion seems to be that the forces for decentralization are so potent
that a favorable business tax climate in the inner city will have no
countering effect. 81 To reverse the migrational trend, the inner city
must change its image by providing better services both in the aes-
thetic and functional areas. Better public services demand new
revenues. The income tax seems to be the only reasonable and
effective solution.
The state's preemption of income taxation causes more harm
than good. First, the legislature denies the city the right to provide
a more equitable tax structure for its inhabitants. Secondly, the
city is denied an effective, reliable source of revenue.82 Lastly, this
denial threatens the city's constitutional guarantee of home rule.
The local income tax has proven to be a resourceful and equitable
source of revenue. Higher property taxes are becoming economically
and politically infeasible. 83 To cover growing costs, the city is forced
either to levy a multitude of low yield, nuisance taxes or to surren-
der more of its autonomy for federal and state subsidies. The cities'
interests in levying a municipal income tax certainly outweigh the
uncertain benefits preemption may provide.
The legislature also desires to prevent the migrational trend
of people and business from the inner city to protect federal and
state tax dollars poured into urban renewal programs.8 ' These tax
dollars will be wasted unless the migrational trend is reversed. How-
ever, the uncertain effects that preemption will have on the migra-
tional trend, do not outweigh the benefits that the city will enjoy
from levying a local income tax. What is even more significant in
this area is that the bulk of redevelopment dollars comes from the
federal government. Yet, the federal government has expressed no
fear that local income taxation may defeat redevelopment programs.
The state and federal governments are not the only agencies
concerned with the city's condition. Preserving our cities demands
a joint effort on the part of federal, state and city government. The
city itself has an interest in its welfare and survival. The deteriora-
tion of the city is probably related to its financial condition. If the
city feels that a local income tax will cause more good than harm,
the city should have the power to act in its own behalf.
TAxATION AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION at 68 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TAXATION
AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION].
81 Id. at 69.
82 See note 2, supra.
83 See note 70, supra.
84 See note 74, supra.
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Another reason the legislature preempted the field was to pre-
vent the chaos of overlapping taxing jurisdictions.8 5 Allowing local
income taxation seems to promote conflict and competition among
neighboring jurisdictions.86 The risk that the non-resident may be
subjected to double local income taxation by his resident munici-
pality and his work municipality seems to be a valid fear.87 But,
the remedy to this possibility already exists. California courts have
long held that the taxing powers of a city extend only to its city
limits. Dealing with occupation taxes based on gross receipts, Cali-
fornia courts hold that the city may base its tax only on income
earned within the city boundaries.88 The same territorial limitation
should apply to a local tax on income. The municipality could only
tax earnings within its city limits.89
Probably the greatest threat the local income tax presents is
placing an unfair local tax burden on the individual who works in
one city and lives in another. This individual may be subjected to
an income tax in his work municipality and also a high property tax
in his home municipality. The total tax burden on the non-resident
worker would be greater than on the individual who lives and
works in the same city. The non-resident worker will pay more
for the benefits he receives. The legislature may have a legitimate
interest in preventing a city from levying an income tax on such
non-residents. But, this interest should not justify prohibiting a city
from levying an income tax on its residents. The local income tax
remains very important to the city. The city would be able to place
a ceiling on increasing property taxes and provide its inhabitants
with a more equitable tax structure. Increased revenue needs would
come from a tax based on ability to pay.
The legislature may be justified in preempting income taxation
of non-resident workers who live in city's that do not levy a local
income tax. The preemption would be justified only because of the
likelihood of high property taxes in the non-resident's home city.
However, once neighboring jurisdictions begin to levy an income
85 CALIF. SENATE FACT FINDING CommiTTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION, A
STUDY OF THE FEASIBILITY OF INCREASING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES
FROM SELECTED TAXES at 33 (1963).
86 See 7 HARV. J. LEGIs. 271, 277-81.
87 City of Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co., 42 Cal. 2d 823, 831, 271 P.2d 5,
10 (1954) ; Ferran v. City of Palo Alto, 50 Cal. App. 2d 374, 379, 122 P.2d 965, 968
(1942).
88 Id.
89 This limitation would favor the inner city. However, the inner cities' greater
needs may justify such favor. See Holtmann, Migration to the Suburbs, Human Cap-
ital, and City Income Tax Losses: A Case Study, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 326 (1968). See
also 22 NAT'L TAX J. 313 which discusses the impact of various local income tax
policies on the inner city and its surrounding suburbs.
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tax, a ceiling would be placed on their increasing property taxes.
The justification for preemption would no longer exist. Cities should
then be able to tax the income of its non-resident workers who live
in cities which also levy an income tax. California's local tax struc-
ture would slowly evolve to a system based not only on ability to
pay but also according to benefits received.
The property tax does not suit our changing commuter society.
The property tax is inflexible. It is designed for a society which lives
and works in the same city. The income tax enables city's to keep
its local tax structures responsive to our urban make-up.
The last fear the legislature has is that local income taxation in
California will have an adverse effect on the state's economy. The
legislature fears that allowing California charter cities to levy local
income taxes will nullify the state's efforts to create a favorable
state tax climate attractive to business.9" A study of state and local
taxation reveals that American business generally dislikes an income
tax structure. Businessmen generally favor sales and use taxes." The
legislature's concern certainly seems warranted. Local income tax-
ation may have an adverse effect on the state's attempts to create
a favorable tax climate. However, whether it is a sufficient basis for
preemption is questionable.
Are the state's interests paramount to the city's? The state
is interested in maintaining a favorable tax climate. Studies reveal
that state tax structures do influence industrial and business loca-
tional decisions. 2 However, their effect on these decisions are
limited. Many other factors such as labor and material supplies are
more fundamental. However, when several basically similar loca-
tions are available, the local tax climate may become a swing
factor.93 The city's interests appear to be equal or paramount to
the state's. The city is interested in maintaining a reliable source of
revenue. The local income tax would not only provide the city with
a sufficient reliable source of revenue but also enable it to provide
its inhabitants with a more equitable tax structure. Also, the court
cannot overlook the fact that it is dealing with an essential power
of the city inherent in the constitutional guarantee of home rule.
The court should recognize that the state and city interests are
equal.
90 The desire to maintain a favorable tax climate attractive to business can be
found in the legislature's declaration that it intends to make sales and use taxes rather
than the income tax its chief source of revenue. Cal. Stats., 1968, ch. 1265, § 2, at
2388-89 (1968).
91 TAXATI ON AND INDUSTRIAL LoCATIoN at 65.
92 Id. at 60.
93 Id.
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APPLYING THE LAW
The proper basis for state preemption of the field of income
taxation should parallel the tests enounced in the case of In re
Hubbard:94 1) The area of taxation is of such paramount concern
that further local taxation cannot be tolerated; or 2) the particular
local tax adversely effects transient citizens in such a manner as to
outweigh the possible benefits to the city.95 Hopefully, these tests
would provide a proper balance between the city's right to tax and
the legislature's right to determine general state tax policies. The((any state interest" test followed in regulatory matters is improper
as a basis for preemption in tax matters. 6 This test would make
California charter cities' taxing powers completely servient to gen-
eral state tax policies. The city's power to tax would become com-
pletely dependent on the legislature. The legislature could preempt
any local tax which has any adverse effect on the state. If the "any
state interest" test is adopted, the legislature's preemption of the
field of income taxation must be sustained.
If the "balancing tests" are applied, the legislature's preemption
may be overruled. Certainly the state's preemption cannot be sus-
tained under the "adverse effects on transients" test. The possible
adverse effects a local income tax may have on transient citizens do
not outweigh the possible benefits to the city. Local income taxation
will not be, burdensome on the majority of California employees.
Evidence shows no difference in per-capita tax burdens between
cities levying an income tax and those which do not.9 7 Neither will
a local income tax be a deterrent to the mobility of the majority of
Californians seeking employment. 8 Undoubtedly, the income tax
may have a deterrent effect on those in the upper income brackets.
But, this adverse effect certainly does not outweigh the benefits
the city will derive from a local income tax. The city will be able
to provide its inhabitants with a more equitable tax structure; place
a ceiling on increasing property taxes; and have a reliable source
of income relatively low in administrative costs.9 9 These definite
benefits to the city outweigh the possible adverse effects on some
transients of the state.
In this author's opinion the "paramount state interest" test
cannot sustain the legislature's preemption of income taxation. The
94 See discussion in text accompanying notes 16-32, supra.
95 In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 815, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393,
399 (1964).
96 See discussion in text accompanying notes 33-37, supra.
97 See note 75 and accompanying text, supra.
98 See p. 22, supra.
99 See pp. 18-20, supra.
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interests of the state are not paramount to those of the city. The
legislature's fears of a local income tax are too uncertain. The city's
benefits from a local income tax are very real. The city's alter-
natives emphasize the necessity of a local income tax even more.
Facing growing costs and insufficient revenues, the city seeking to
be somewhat self-sufficient has no alternative but to levy a multitude
of low yield sales and use taxes. The property tax is becoming in-
adequate. Reliance on federal and state subsidies means the sur-
render of more of the city's independence in deciding its own fiscal
policies. The necessary alternative is the municipal income tax.
CONCLUSION
Determining whether a city may levy an income tax despite
express legislative prohibition is no. easy task. The easy solution
is to adopt the "any state interest" test espoused in Century Plaza
Hotel.'00 However, such an approach is not realistic. The "any state
interest" test denies the city its constitutional guarantee of home
rule. It renders the city's power to tax completely subject to state
tax policies. California courts must define a basis for preemption in
areas of taxation which will balance the interests of the city against
those of the state. The "paramount state interest" test or the "ad-
verse effects on transients" test recognize this need for balancing.
The courts must recognize these tests if the home rule provisions
of the Constitution are to have any meaning. The application of
such tests is difficult but necessary. Under these tests, this author
believes that the city should be able to exercise its inherent taxing
power to tax income. The legislature's preemption of the field would
be invalid.
Ronald Hansen
100 Century Plaza Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. App. 3d 616, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 166 (1970).
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